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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
Ronald Jones appeals from the denial of his petition for 
a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 2254. The 
District Court denied the petition on several grounds, and 
we granted a certificate of appealability to consider whether 
the petition was properly denied as time-barred under 
AEDPA's one-year statute of limitations. We agree with the 
District Court that the petition was time-barred, and 
accordingly, we will affirm. 
 
I. 
 
A jury in Cumberland County, New Jersey, convicted 
Jones of first-degree kidnaping, four counts offirst-degree 
aggravated sexual assault, and possession of a weapon for 
an unlawful purpose. On October 19, 1981, the trial court 
sentenced Jones to an aggregate term of 55 years of 
imprisonment with 25 years of parole ineligibility. Jones 
was represented at trial and sentencing by privately 
retained counsel. 
 
Eight years after sentencing, Jones asked the Public 
Defender's Office to file a motion with the Appellate Division 
of the New Jersey Superior Court for leave to file a direct 
appeal nunc pro tunc. Jones alleged that trial counsel had 
ignored his request to file a timely notice of appeal. The 
Appellate Division remanded the matter for the trial court 
to make a factual determination as to whether Jones asked 
counsel to file a notice of appeal within 45 days following 
entry of the judgment of conviction, which is the time 
prescribed for an appeal under New Jersey Court Rule 2:4- 
1(a). 
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The trial court held hearings on the issue on September 
6 and 19, 1990.1 Jones and his trial counsel testified on 
September 6. Jones's uncle, who apparently had retained 
Jones's trial counsel, testified on September 19. Counsel 
from the Public Defender's Office represented Jones at the 
hearings. Jones did not attend the hearing on September 
19 due to the trial court's failure to issue a writ to secure 
his presence. 
 
The trial court determined that Jones did not ask counsel 
to file a notice of appeal within 45 days of entry of the 
judgment. The Appellate Division reviewed the record, 
concluded that there was "an adequate basis to determine 
that [Jones] made no timely request to his attorney to file 
an appeal," and on November 1, 1990, denied leave to 
appeal nunc pro tunc. On April 30, 1992, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court denied Jones's petition for certification to 
review the issue. 
 
On January 8, 1993, Jones filed a pro se habeas corpus 
petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 2254. Although a copy of 
that petition is not part of the present record, there is no 
dispute that Jones raised five claims, and on January 24, 
1994, the District Court dismissed the petition in its 
entirety without prejudice due to Jones's failure to exhaust 
available state court remedies under the New Jersey post- 
conviction review statute. 
 
On March 28, 1995, Jones filed a second pro se S 2254 
petition in which he raised three claims: (1) trial counsel's 
failure to file a timely direct appeal amounted to ineffective 
assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment; 
(2) Jones's Fourteenth Amendment right to due process was 
violated when the state courts denied his request for leave 
to file a nunc pro tunc direct appeal; and (3) the state trial 
court violated Jones's Fourteenth Amendment right to due 
process when it failed to issue a writ for his appearance at 
the second day of the evidentiary hearing. On April 24, 
1996, while Jones's petition was pending, the Antiterrorism 
and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA") was enacted. On 
July 15, 1996, the District Court granted the State's motion 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Transcripts of the hearings are not part of the record before this 
Court. 
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to dismiss the petition, ruling that Jones raised "no federal 
claim cognizable in a habeas proceeding...." See Dist. Op., 
July 15, 1996, at 4. In the alternative, the District Court 
noted that Jones again failed to exhaust available state 
court remedies, and that his petition must be dismissed for 
that reason. 
 
Jones timely appealed and applied for a certificate of 
appealability. On January 13, 1997, we entered a summary 
order denying the request for a certificate of appealability 
"for failure to exhaust state court remedies." See C.A. No. 
96-5471. We denied Jones's timely petition for a panel 
rehearing on February 14, 1997. 
 
Rather than present his claims to the state courts, Jones 
filed a third pro se S 2254 petition on November 3, 1997. He 
raised the same three claims that he had raised in the 
second petition. The State moved to dismiss the petition, 
arguing that: Jones had again failed to satisfy the 
exhaustion requirement; the petition was barred under 
AEDPA's one-year statute of limitations, see S 2244(d)(1); 
the petition was "second or successive" or an "abuse of the 
writ" and required certification from this Court before it 
could be filed in the District Court, seeS 2244(b); and the 
claims raised in the petition lacked merit. 
 
On April 9, 1998, the District Court denied the petition 
with prejudice as "successive" because Jones had presented 
the same three claims in his previous petition, and the 
District Court had denied that petition on the merits. The 
District Court also ruled that the petition was barred under 
the statute of limitations, finding that, "even if it was 
appropriate to begin the limitation period from the July 15, 
1996, denial of his second petition (which it is not), 
petitioner is time barred." Dist. Ct. Op. at 6. Assuming it 
could reach the merits, the District Court denied Jones's 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim in light of the state 
court's finding that Jones had not asked his attorney to file 
a timely notice of appeal. The District Court ruled that 
"petitioner's attorney's failure to file an appeal was not 
unreasonable given that petitioner did not make such a 
request. Furthermore, petitioner has not shown that his 
attorney's performance resulted in any prejudice-- he has 
not sufficiently shown that he would have had any success 
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on appeal of either his conviction or sentence." Id. at 7-8. 
The District Court also ruled that the state courts did not 
violate due process in denying Jones's request to appeal 
nunc pro tunc or in failing to issue a writ to secure his 
presence at the second day of the evidentiary hearing. The 
District Court denied a certificate of appealability, and this 
timely appeal followed. 
 
II. 
 
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
S 2254(a). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
SS 1291, 2253. As noted, we granted a certificate of 
appealability limited to the issues of whether the District 
Court properly dismissed Jones's petition as time-barred 
under the statute of limitations, and whether Jones was 
entitled to any tolling of the limitations period pursuant to 
either 28 U.S.C. S 2244(d)(2) or the holding in Miller v. New 
Jersey State Dep't of Corr., 145 F.3d 616 (3d Cir. 1998). 
Our review of the statute of limitations issue is plenary. See 
Algrant v. Evergreen Valley Nurseries Ltd. Partnership, 126 
F.3d 178, 181 (3d Cir. 1997).2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. As to the issues on which a certificate of appealability was not 
granted, but which the State nevertheless pursues in its brief as grounds 
for affirmance, we note the following. Although the District Court denied 
Jones's second petition on the merits, we denied his request for a 
certificate of appealability solely on the ground that he failed to 
exhaust 
state court remedies. Our disposition on exhaustion grounds was 
controlling. See generally Hohn v. United States , 524 U.S. 236, 246 
(1998) (rejecting "the contention ... that a request to proceed before a 
court of appeals should be regarded as a threshold inquiry separate from 
the merits which, if denied, prevents the case from ever being in the 
court of appeals."). Because Jones's prior petitions were dismissed as 
unexhausted, the instant petition was not "second or successive" or an 
"abuse of the writ," and this Court's authorization to file the petition 
was 
unnecessary. See Christy v. Horn, 115 F.3d 201, 208 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 
Jones's claims are unexhausted because he has yet to raise them in 
state court, and although almost 18 years have passed since he was 
sentenced, it cannot be said that state post-conviction review on the 
merits of his claims is now "clearly foreclosed." See Toulson v. Beyer, 
987 
F.2d 984, 987 (3d Cir. 1993); Gibson v. Scheidemantel, 805 F.2d 135, 
139 (3d Cir. 1986); Santana v. Felton, 685 F.2d 71, 75 (3d Cir. 1982); see 
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III. 
 
A state prisoner seeking habeas corpus relief pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. S 2254 must comply with a statute of limitations 
that provides, in relevant part, as follows: 
 
       (d)(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an 
       application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in 
       custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The 
       limitation period shall run from the latest of-- 
 
       (A) the date on which the judgment became final by the 
       conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time 
       for seeking such review[.] 
 
       . . . 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
also State v. Afanador, 697 A.2d. 529, 534 (N.J. 1997); State v. Preciose, 
609 A.2d 1280, 1285 (N.J. 1992); State v. Mitchell, 601 A.2d 198 (N.J. 
1992); State v. Guzman, 712 A.2d 1233, 1238 (N.J. App. Div. 1998); 
State v. Williams, 706 A.2d 795, 797 (N.J. App. Div. 1998); State v. 
Moore, 641 A.2d 268 (N.J. App. Div. 1994). 
 
Finally, while a habeas claim can be denied on the merits 
notwithstanding nonexhaustion, see S 2254(b)(2), the State raised the 
exhaustion defense in this case, and "[a] State shall not be deemed to 
have waived the exhaustion requirement" unless it does so expressly. 
See S 2254(b)(3). Furthermore, S 2254(b)(2) is properly invoked only when 
" `it is perfectly clear that the applicant does not raise even a 
colorable 
federal claim.' " Lambert v. Blackwell, 134 F.3d 506, 515 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(quoting Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 135 (1987)). "[I]f a question 
exists as to whether the petitioner has stated a colorable federal claim, 
the district court may not consider the merits of the claim if the 
petitioner has failed to exhaust state remedies...." Id. Although the 
state 
courts have ruled that Jones did not ask counsel tofile a timely notice 
of appeal, that finding alone, which was made in the context of Jones's 
request for a direct appeal nunc pro tunc, did not eviscerate Jones's 
ineffective-assistance claim under the Sixth Amendment: the State has 
cited no precedent of the United States Supreme Court, and we have 
found none, holding that the failure to file a notice of appeal is 
inconsistent with the Sixth Amendment only if counsel ignored a 
defendant's specific request to file a notice of appeal. In addition, 
while 
Jones's due process claims were arguably meritless, he did not fail to 
state "even a colorable federal claim," and because the due process 
claims were likewise unexhausted, it was improper to reach the merits 
of those claims. See id. 
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       (d)(2) The time during which a properly filed application 
       for State post-conviction or other collateral review with 
       respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending 
       shall not be counted toward any period of limitation 
       under this subsection. 
 
28 U.S.C. S 2244(d)(1)-(2). 
 
Under S 2244(d)(1)(A), a state court criminal judgment 
becomes "final," and the statute of limitations begins to 
run, "at the conclusion of review in the United States 
Supreme Court or when the time for seeking certiorari 
review expires." Kapral v. United States, 166 F.3d 565, 575 
(3d Cir. 1999); see also Morris v. Horn, ___ F.3d ___, No. 98- 
9008, 1999 WL 592440, at *2 n.1 (3d Cir. Aug. 9, 1999). 
Jones was sentenced on October 19, 1981. Under New 
Jersey law, he had 45 days to file a direct appeal. He failed 
to file an appeal within the time allowed. In 1989, Jones 
sought leave to file an appeal nunc pro tunc. The Appellate 
Division denied that request, and the New Jersey Supreme 
Court affirmed on April 30, 1992. It is clear that Jones's 
conviction became "final" prior to AEDPA's enactment on 
April 24, 1996. 
 
In Burns v. Morton, 134 F.3d 109 (3d Cir. 1998), we 
concluded that "applying S 2244(d)(1) to bar the filing of a 
habeas petition before April 24, 1997, where the prisoner's 
conviction became final before April 24, 1996, would be 
impermissibly retroactive." Id. at 111. Accordingly, we held 
that "habeas petitions filed on or before April 23, 1997, may 
not be dismissed for failure to comply with S 2244(d)(1)'s 
time limit." Id. We also held that "a pro se prisoner's habeas 
petition is deemed filed at the moment he delivers it to 
prison officials for mailing to the district court." Id. at 113. 
Thus, under Burns, Jones was required to deposit his 
petition in the prison mail system on or before April 23, 
1997, to effect a timely filing. 
 
Jones's petition was signed and dated August 19, 1997, 
and his memorandum of law in support of the petition was 
signed and dated September 15, 1997. The petition was 
stamped "filed" by the District Court Clerk's Office on 
November 3, 1997. Although the record does not reflect the 
actual date on which he handed the petition to prison 
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officials for mailing, it is clear that Jones mailed the 
petition after April 23, 1997, and Jones has not suggested 
otherwise. Thus, even if we assume that the earliest of the 
above dates, August 19, 1997, reflects the date of mailing, 
the petition was filed almost four months after the 
limitations period expired. As a result, the District Court 
properly granted the State's motion to dismiss unless Jones 
can establish a basis for tolling the limitations period. A 
petitioner can seek tolling in two ways: (i) statutory tolling 
under S 2244(d)(2), or (ii) equitable tolling. 
 
(i) Statutory tolling 
 
Section 2244(d)(2) provides that "[t]he time during which 
a properly filed application for State post-conviction or 
other collateral review with respect to the pertinent 
judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward 
any period of limitation under this subsection."S 2244(d)(2). 
Jones contends, inter alia, that he is entitled to tolling 
under S 2244(d)(2) for the period following AEDPA's 
enactment during which his second habeas petition was 
pending in federal court. See Appellant's Br. at 17-18. On 
the date AEDPA was enacted (April 24, 1996), Jones's 
second petition was pending in the District Court. The 
District Court denied that petition on July 15, 1996, and 
Jones timely filed an appeal to this Court. Jones's request 
for a certificate of appealability was denied on January 13, 
1997. Jones's timely petition for panel rehearing was 
denied on February 14, 1997. Thus, from the date of 
AEDPA's enactment on April 24, 1996, until February 14, 
1997-- a period of almost 10 months-- Jones had the same 
claims that he raised in his third petition pending before a 
federal court in his second petition. If Jones were afforded 
tolling for that time, his third petition could be deemed 
timely filed. 
 
Although Jones does not elaborate on this point in his 
brief, the validity of his tolling argument turns on how the 
language of S 2244(d)(2) should be interpreted. Specifically, 
the question is whether Congress used the word "State" in 
S 2244(d)(2) to modify the term "post-conviction" as well as 
the term "other collateral" so that tolling is afforded only for 
a properly filed application for state review, or whether, as 
Jones would argue, "State" modifies only "post-conviction," 
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leaving the phrase "other collateral review" as a catch-all 
that is broad enough to permit tolling for the time that a 
properly filed application for federal habeas review is 
pending. 
 
This issue appears to be one of first impression for our 
Court, but we see no need to dwell on it here, as we are 
persuaded by the analysis of the majority of Courts that 
have considered the issue that the statute of limitations is 
not tolled under S 2244(d)(2) for the time during which a 
habeas petition is pending in federal court. See Sperling v. 
White, 30 F. Supp.2d 1246, 1250 (C.D. Cal. 1998) ("A 
natural reading of the statute concludes that section 
2244(d)(2) does not contemplate tolling limitations during 
the time a habeas petition is pending in federal court."); 
Kethley v. Berge, 14 F. Supp.2d 1077, 1079 (E.D. Wisc. 
1998) (opining that there would be no tolling under 
S 2244(d)(2) for time that unexhausted claims in federal 
habeas petition were pending in District Court); Harrison v. 
Galaza, No. C98-3371, 1999 WL 58594, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 
Feb. 4, 1999) ("The running of the limitation period is not 
tolled, as petitioner contends, for the time period during 
which a properly filed application for post-conviction or 
other collateral review is pending in federal court."); Vincze 
v. Hickman, No. Civ. S-98-044, 1999 WL 68330, at *1 (E.D. 
Cal. Jan. 13, 1999) ("[T]he court concludes that the 
statutory tolling provision set forth in Section 2244(d)(2) 
does not toll the period during the pendency of petitioner's 
first federal habeas petition."); Babcock v. Duncan, No. C97- 
2740, 1997 WL 724450, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 1997) ("No 
court has found that the running of the limitations period 
also is tolled . . . for the time period during which a 
properly filed [habeas corpus petition] is pending in federal 
court."); but see Barrett v. Yearwood, ___ F. Supp.2d. ___, 
No. Civ. S-98-2226, 1999 WL 676220, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 
1, 1999) (holding that the "plain meaning" ofS 2244(d)(2) "is 
that the statute of limitations is tolled during the pendency 
of any properly filed federal habeas corpus petition"). 
 
As the District Court explained in Sperling v. White, 
Congress clearly intended that the word "State" would be 
read to modify both "post-conviction" and "other collateral," 
so that tolling would be afforded under S 2244(d)(2) for 
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various forms of state review only. See 30 F.Supp.2d at 
1249-53. We find nothing in S 2244(d)(2)'s language or 
legislative history, and nothing in the policy concerns 
behind AEDPA's enactment, to suggest a contrary result. 
Consequently, Jones is not entitled to tolling under 
S 2244(d)(2), and he is limited to seeking an"equitable 
tolling" of the limitations period. 
 
(ii) Equitable tolling 
 
In Miller v. New Jersey State Dep't of Corr., 145 F.3d 616 
(3d Cir. 1998), we determined that AEDPA's one-yearfiling 
requirement is a statute of limitations, not a jurisdictional 
rule, and thus a habeas petition should not be dismissed 
as untimely filed if the petitioner can establish an equitable 
basis for tolling the limitations period. We observed in Miller 
that "equitable tolling is proper only when the`principles of 
equity would make the rigid application of a limitation 
period unfair.' " Id. at 618 (quoting Shendock v. Director, 
Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 893 F.2d 1458, 1462 
(3d Cir. 1990) (in banc)) (punctuation marks omitted). This 
"unfairness" generally occurs "when the petitioner has `in 
some extraordinary way ... been prevented from asserting 
his or her rights.' " Id. (quoting Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, 
Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380 (3d Cir. 1994)). Finally, we 
noted that " `the petitioner must show that he or she 
`exercised reasonable diligence in investigating and bringing 
[the] claims.'... Mere excusable neglect is not sufficient." Id. 
at 618-19 (citations omitted). 
 
In other cases, we have explained that equitable tolling 
"may be appropriate if (1) the defendant has actively misled 
the plaintiff, (2) if the plaintiff has `in some extraordinary 
way' been prevented from asserting his rights, or (3) if the 
plaintiff has timely asserted his rights mistakenly in the 
wrong forum." United States v. Midgley, 142 F.3d 174, 179 
(3d Cir. 1998) (quoting Kocian v. Getty Refining & Mktg. Co., 
707 F.2d 748, 753 (3d Cir. 1983)). In Seitzinger v. Reading 
Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 165 F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 1999), we recently 
held that "equitable tolling may be appropriate[in a Title 
VII action] when a claimant received inadequate notice of 
her right to file suit, where a motion for appointment of 
counsel is pending, or where the court has misled the 
plaintiff into believing that she had done everything 
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required of her." Id. at 240 (citing Baldwin Cty. Welcome 
Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 151 (1984)). In the final 
analysis, however, "a statute of limitations should be tolled 
only in the rare situation where equitable tolling is 
demanded by sound legal principles as well as the interests 
of justice." Midgley, 142 F.3d at 179 (quotations marks and 
citation omitted); see also Seitzinger, 165 F.3d at 239 ("The 
law is clear that courts must be sparing in their use of 
equitable tolling."). 
 
In the present case, Jones has offered no explanation for 
his failure to pursue state court remedies after the District 
Court dismissed his first petition on exhaustion grounds. In 
the second petition, Jones raised the same unexhausted 
claims. After this Court denied a certificate of appealability 
on exhaustion grounds, Jones refiled the same claims in 
his third petition, again having failed to present those 
claims to the state courts. There is nothing in the record to 
suggest, and Jones has not alleged, that "there is an 
absence of available State corrective process," or that 
"circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to 
protect the rights of the applicant," such that the 
exhaustion requirement should be excused. See  
S 2254(b)(1)(B)(i)-(ii). 
 
Jones argues that, "[b]y filing three pro se petitions, [he 
has] demonstrated his intent to be heard in federal court. 
He, therefore, cannot be deemed guilty of willful and 
inexcusable neglect, or even unreasonable delay, such that 
laches applies.... Instead of `sitting on his hands,' Petitioner 
moved, three separate times, in federal court, to vindicate 
his appellate rights, in state court. After these repeated 
efforts to be heard, it would be inequitable for Appellant to 
be time-barred." Appellant's Br. at 15-16. Jones seems to 
misunderstand the exhaustion requirement. Before his 
claims can be heard in federal court, he must present them 
to the state courts for review, which he can do pursuant to 
the New Jersey post-conviction review statute. Jones has 
made no showing that he "exercised reasonable diligence" 
in satisfying the exhaustion requirement in order to present 
his claims in a timely federal habeas petition. Cf. New 
Castle Cty. v. Halliburton NUS Corp., 111 F.3d 1116, 1126 
(3d Cir. 1997) (stating that, to invoke equitable tolling, a 
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party must show an exercise of reasonable diligence in 
bringing the claims). Instead, he has chosen on three 
occasions to file his claims in federal court without first 
pursuing state court remedies. Although it appears that 
Jones was simply mistaken in his belief that he could 
obtain review in federal court without having presented his 
claims to the state courts, his misunderstanding of the 
exhaustion requirement is insufficient to excuse his failure 
to comply with the statute of limitations. 
 
In sum, Jones has established no basis for an equitable 
tolling of the time during which his second habeas petition 
was pending in federal court. 
 
(iii) Relation back 
 
The final argument that Jones seems to raise is that the 
filing date of his third petition should "relate back" to the 
filing date of his first or second petition, both of which were 
filed prior to AEDPA's enactment and were dismissed 
without prejudice for failure to exhaust state remedies. See 
Appellant's Br. at 17-18. If the filing date of the third 
petition relates back, it was improper to dismiss the 
petition as time-barred. We cannot agree with this 
argument. 
 
The District Court dismissed Jones's first petition 
without prejudice for failure to exhaust state remedies, and 
his case was closed. On the second petition, this Court 
denied a certificate of appealability on exhaustion grounds. 
Our order did not leave Jones's case open in federal court; 
rather, we dismissed the case without prejudice to Jones's 
ability to refile his claims after complying with the 
exhaustion requirement. Because the first and second 
petitions were dismissed, and the cases closed, there was 
nothing for Jones's third petition to relate back to. 
Traditionally, a statute of limitations is not tolled by the 
filing of a complaint that is subsequently dismissed without 
prejudice. As we explained in a recent habeas case, 
"[t]ypically, when a complaint (or habeas petition) is 
dismissed without prejudice, that complaint or petition is 
treated as if it never existed." Hull v. Kyler, ___ F.3d ___, No. 
97-7551, 1999 WL 636957, at *13 (3d Cir. Aug. 23, 1999) 
(citations omitted). Thus, courts have recognized that, if a 
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petition is dismissed for failure to exhaust state remedies, 
a subsequent petition filed after exhaustion is completed 
cannot be considered an amendment to the prior petition, 
but must be considered a new action. See Graham v. 
Johnson, 168 F.3d 762, 775-81 (5th Cir. 1999), petition for 
cert. filed, ___ U.S.L.W. ___ (U.S. June 21, 1999) (No. 98- 
10002); Henry v. Lungren, 164 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9th Cir. 
1999), petition for cert. filed, 68 U.S.L.W. 3021 (U.S. June 
30, 1999) (No. 99-26). Accordingly, we reject Jones's 
argument that the filing date of his third petition somehow 
related back to the filing date of his first or second petition. 
 
IV. 
 
To summarize, Jones's petition was untimely filed, and 
he has failed to establish any basis for a tolling of the 
limitations period. Accordingly, we will affirm the District 
Court's order denying Jones's habeas petition on the 
ground that the petition was untimely filed under 
S 2244(d)(1)'s one-year statute of limitations. 
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